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STUDENT ARTICLE
The Do-Not-Call Implementation Act:
Legislating the Sound of Silence
Douglas C. Nelson*

I.

Introduction

Consumers recently ranked telemarketing fourth among the
one hundred worst ideas of the 20th century.1 And while the 20th
century is behind us, the problem is not. Indeed, consumer
complaints to the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") in regard to
telemarketing calls increased ten-fold between 1998 and 2002.2
Telemarketing calls represent a frequent and substantial intrusion
upon the consumer's fundamental right to be left alone in the privacy
of the home.
In March, Congress enacted the Do-Not-Call Implementation
Act ("DNCIA"),4 a short piece of legislation that shifts the balance of
power in the consumer's long-standing struggle with the
telemarketing industry. No longer must consumers defend their basic
right to be left alone in their homes with nothing more than Caller ID,
* J.D. candidate, May 2005, Loyola University Chicago School of Law; B.A.
English, Michigan State University.

'Ian Ayres & Matthew Funk, Marketing Privacy, 20 YALE J. ON. REG. 77, 79
(2003).
2 H.R. REP. No. 108-8, at 2 (2003), reprintedin 2003 U.S.C.C.A.N. 668, 669.
3 Ayres & Funk, supra note 1, at 79. Worse yet, many telemarketers are
perpetrating frauds rather than promoting legitimate businesses. Typical
telemarketing frauds include: phony prizes, illegal sweepstakes, sham investments,
fraudulent charities, credit-report restructuring, and vacation packages with hidden
costs. Edwin L. Klett & Rochelle L. Brightwell, Telemarketing: Exercise in Free
Speech or Just a Pain in the Neck?, 24-DEC PA. LAW. 38, 39 (2002).
4 Do-Not-Call Implementation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-10, 117 Stat. 557
(codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 6101-6108 (2003)).
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an unlisted number, and an itchy hang-up finger.' The DNCIA
provides for the creation of a national do-not-call list of consumer
phone numbers, which will be off-limits to those telemarketers who
are subject to the FTC's jurisdiction. 6 But, the DNCIA does not stop
there, and soon consumers will be able to virtually eliminate the
"shrill and imperious ring ' 7 of the unwanted telemarketing call.
This note first reviews the history of telemarketing laws and
First Amendment challenges leading up to the DNCIA. Then, this
note summarizes the main elements of the DNCIA and discusses
alternatives to the present law. Finally, this note considers the
implementation and enforcement issues that lie ahead and evaluates
the impact that this legislation will have on consumers.

II. Prior Legislative Responses to an Excess of Calls
Telemarketing is a $274.2 billion industry, employing 4.1
million people. 8 The relatively low cost of making a telemarketing
call permits companies to profitably disturb thirty people in exchange
for making a sale to the thirty-first prospect. 9 But each of the failed
calls may have a detrimental effect on the market as a whole. 10 Have
telemarketers called too often and while seeking individual profits,
collectively crippled their market? At least one commentator has
compared the current state of the consumer telephone network to an
over-fished lake, decimated in a classic "tragedy of the commons"
scenario.'l In fact, evidence suggests the effects of this over-fishing
may be accelerating.' 2 Legislators and their constituents, however, do
not appear convinced that over-fishing alone will drive significant
numbers of telemarketers out of business, at least not soon enough.

5 Ayres & Funk, supra note 1, at 106.

Do-Not-Call Implementation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-10, 117 Stat. 557
(codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 6101-6108 (2003)); see infra text accompanying note 48.
7 Patricia Pattison & Anthony F. McGann, State Telemarketing Legislation: A
Whole Lotta Law Goin'On!, 3 Wyo. L. REv. 167, 168 (2003).
8 H.R. REP. No. 108-8, at 2.
6

9 Ayres & Funk, supra note 1, at 79.
'0Id. at
"

87-88.

Id. at 87-93.

12 Id.

at 89-90 (Pollsters' response rates appear to be declining precipitously.
From 65-70% in their heyday, to at least 50% ten years ago, to as low as 15-20%
presently); see also supra text accompanying note 2.
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A. State Telemarketing
Law: "A Patchwork of Ineffective
,, 3
Remedies

State legislators have responded to their angry constituents
with a vast amount of legislation.14 Currently, all but six states have
15
enacted consumer protection laws regulating telemarketing.
Typically, state legislation has: (1) required telemarketers to identify
themselves at the outset of the call; (2) prohibited telemarketers from
blocking their identity from Caller ID systems; and (3) prohibited
16
calls enacted
before 8do-not-call
a.m. and statutes.
after 9 .m.
nineteen
states
have
StatesFurthermore,
with established
do-not-call

13

Pattison & McGann, supra note 7, at 197.

14

See id. at 168-70.

15 ALA. CODE § 18-19A (2003); ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.475 (Michie 2002);
ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-1271 (West 2003); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-99-101
(Michie 2003); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17511.1 (West 2003); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 6-1-301 (2003); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-288a(b) (2003); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 6, § 2503A (2003); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.059 (West 2003); GA. CODE ANN. §
10-5B-1 (2003); HAw. REV. STAT. § 481P (2002); IDAHO CODE § 48-1001 (Michie
2003); 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 413/1 (2003); IND. CODE ANN. § 24-5-12-1 (Michie
2003); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-670 (2003); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 367/46951 (BanksBaldwin 2003); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45:811 (West 2002); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 10 §§ 1498, 1499 (West 2002); MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 14-2201 (2003);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.111 (West 2002); MINN. STAT. § 325E.26-31
(2003); MISS. CODE ANN. § 77-3-601 (2003); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 407.1101 (West.
2003); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-14- 502 (2003); NEV. REV. STAT. § 599B (2003);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 48:17-29 (West 2003); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-50-1 (Michie 2003);
N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 399-p (McKinney 2003); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-260
(2002); N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-28-01 (2003); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4719.01
(West 2002); 15 OKLA. STAT. tit. § 775A (2002); OR. REV. STAT. § 646.551 (2003);
73 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2241 (2002); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-61-1 (2002); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 37-30A-1 (Michie 2003); TENN. CODE. ANN. § 65-4- 405 (2003); TEx Bus.
& COM. CODE ANN. § 38.101 (Vernon 2003); UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-26-1 (2002);
VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-21 (Michie 2002); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.158.010
(West 2002); W. VA. CODE § 46A-6F-101 (2002); Wis. STAT. § 100.52 (2003);
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 40-12-301 (Michie 2002); see also Pattison & McGann, supra
note 7, at 176-77 (Only Iowa, Massachusetts, Nebraska, New Hampshire, South
Carolina, and Vermont do not have consumer protection laws regulating
telemarketing).
16 Pattison & McGann, supra note 7, at 189-90.
17

ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.475 (Michie 2002); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-99-404

(Michie 2003); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17592 (West 2003); COLO. REV. STAT. §
6-1-905 (West 2003); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-288(b) (2003); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 501.059 (West 2003); GA. CODE ANN. § 46-5-27 (2003); IDAHO CODE § 48-1003A
(Michie); IND. CODE ANN. § 24-4.7-2-1 (Michie 2003); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §
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lists have recently seen a spike in consumer registration,' 8 and states
that have created lists in the last
few years have experienced
9
outset.'
the
from
demand
enormous
Under these statutes, violators may be fined, but enforcement
of state legislation has been a problem. 2° In many cases, state
legislation is so riddled with exceptions that the law has been
rendered "practically unenforceable.", 21 For example, Kentucky
provides 22 exemptions to its telemarketing regulations, prohibiting
only an estimated 5% of telemarketing calls. State telemarketing
regulations, as a whole,
have been characterized as a "patchwork of
23
ineffective remedies."
B. Telephone Consumer Protection Act
Although more than forty states had limited telemarketing in
some way by 1991, Congress determined that federal legislation was
necessary to restrict interstate calls that state laws were not
reaching. Congress passed the Telephone Consumer Protection Act
("TCPA") in 1991,25 which sought to balance "privacy rights, public
367.46955 (Banks-Baldwin 2003); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45:844.14 (West 2002);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32 §14716 (West 2003); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 407.1098
(West. 2003); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 399-z (McKinney 2003); OR. REv. STAT. §
646.569 (2003); TENN. CODE. ANN. § 65-4- 405 (2003); TEx Bus. & COM. CODE
ANN. § 43.101 (Vernon 2003); Wis. STAT. § 100.52 (2003); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 4012-302 (Michie 2002); see also Ayres & Funk, supra note 1, at 79.
18 Ayres & Funk, supra note 1, at 91. Florida's do-not-call registration, for
example, has increased by more than 370% in the last five years. See id. (referring
to Interview with Beth Evans, Regulatory Consultant, Florida Department of
Agriculture and Consumer Services (July 8, 2001)).
19 Id. at 92 (citing Press Release, Connecticut Department of Consumer
Protection, Telemarketer Pays $25,000 to Consumer Protection for Violating
State's Do No [sic] Call List Law (Sept. 6, 2002)).
20 Michael E. Shannon, Combating Unsolicited Sales Calls: The "Do- NotCall" Approach to Solving the Telemarketing Problem, 27 J. LEGIs. 381, 411
(2001).
21 id.
22

See KY. REV.

STAT. ANN. §§

367.46951-367.46999.

23 Pattison & McGann, supra note 7, at 197.
24

S.REP. No. 102-178, at 3 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1968,

1970.
25 Telephone Fraud Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 47 U.S.C. § 227

(2002).
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26
safety interests, and commercial freedoms of speech and trade."
The TCPA prohibited: (1) the use of automatic dialer equipment and
prerecorded messages to emergency lines and hospitals; (2)
unsolicited fax advertisements without the 2consent
of the recipient;
7
and (3) prerecorded calls to residential lines.
The TCPA also directed the Federal Communications
Commission ("FCC") to develop regulations for all telephone
solicitations
to residential subscribers 9 Although the Act
authorized the creation of a national do-not-call list, the FCC rejected
30
this option as "costly and difficult to establish and maintain.
Instead, the FCC required each telemarketer to maintain a specific
do-not-call list of consumers who have asked the company not to call
again. 3' But company-specific do-not-call lists have failed to protect
consumers from unwanted calls because consumers must continually
assert their do-not-call rights to each and every telemarketer.
Moreover, consumers' attempts to invoke this provision have been
frustrated by telemarketers who simply ignore these do-not-call
requests 33 and by the increased use of predictive dialing systems that

26

27

Telephone Fraud Consumer Protection Act § 2(9).
47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1).

47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(3) (The TCPA's definition of a "telephone solicitation"
excludes calls to a party who has given express permission, calls to a party with
whom the caller has an established business relationship, and calls from tax-exempt
nonprofit organizations).
29 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(e) (The FCC's definition of "residential subscribers"
2'

includes wireless phones).
30 See In re Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act of 1991, 7 F.C.C.R. 8752, 11 (1992), available at 1992 WL
690928. Conversely, the Congressional Budget Office presently estimates that the
net effect of implementing a national do-not-call list on the federal budget will be
insignificant. H.R. REP. No. 108-8, at 6 (2003). Recently, the FCC explained that
"advances in computer technology and software now make the compilation and
maintenance of a national database a more reasonable proposition. In addition,
considerable experience has been gained [since 1992] through the implementation
of many state do-not-call lists." In re Rules and Regulations Implementing the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) of 1991, 68 Fed. Reg. 44,144,
44,145-46 (July 25, 2003) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pts. 64 and 68).
"' 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(d).
32 Mainstream Mlktg. Servs., Inc. v. FTC, No. CIV. A. 03 N0184, 2003 WL
22213517, at *3 (D. Colo. Sept. 25, 2003).
33id.
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often leave consumers talking to dead air. 34 Like many of its state
counterparts, the FCC also imposed time of day35restrictions, limiting
telemarketing calls to between 8 a.m. and 9 p.m.
Although the FCC may bring its own administrative action
against willful or repeated violators, 36 the TCPA's principal
enforcement mechanism is private action.37 The TCPA, however,
provides for only nominal private recoveries and does not allow the
prevailing party to recover attorney fees. 39 Generally, private ncauses
of action under the TCPA have not been aggressively litigated.
C. Telemarketing Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act
The federal government's next major foray into telemarketing
regulation was the Telemarketing Consumer Fraud and Abuse
Prevention Act ("TCFAPA"), passed in 1994.41 The TCFAPA was
principally concerned with telemarketing fraud and required the FTC
42
to promulgate rules prohibiting deceptive telemarketing practices.
Accordingly, the FTC issued its Telemarketing Sales Rule
("TSR").43 The TSR required telemarketers to disclose, among other
things, their identity and the purpose of their call.44 Other provisions
prohibited misrepresentations regarding material aspects of the goods

34 Rules and Regulations Implementing the TCPA, 68 Fed. Reg. at 44,145.
15

47 C.F.R. § 64.1200 (c)(1) (2003).

36

47 U.S.C. § 503(b) (1992).

37 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3); Hilary B. Miller & Robert R. Biggerstaff,

Application of the Telephone ConsumerProtectionAct to Intrastate Telemarketing
Calls and Faxes, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 667, 668-69 (2000).
38 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3).
39 Miller & Biggerstaff, supra note 37, at 668-69; see also 137 CONG. REC.

S16204 (1991) (statement of Sen. Hollings) ("Nevertheless, it is my hope that
states will make it as easy as possible for consumers to bring such [TCPA] actions,
preferably in small claims court .... Small claims court or a similar court would
allow the consumer to appear before the court without an attorney.").
40 Miller & Biggerstaff, supra note 37, at 669.

Telemarketing Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act, 15 U.S.C. §
6101 (1994).
42 15 U.S.C. § 6101.
41

43 FTC Telemarketing Sales Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 310 (2003).
44 16 C.F.R. § 310.4(d).
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or services being offered.45 The TSR also included a company
specific do-not-call list similar to that prescribed by the FCC under
the TCPA.46
The scope of the TSR, however, is limited to activities within
the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission Act.4 7
Consequently, banks, credit unions, savings and loans, common
carriers, non-profit associations, insurance companies, and intrastate
telemarketing
4 calls fall outside the scope of the FTC's telemarketing
regulations. f
The TCFAPA and TSR have greatly expanded the FTC's
authority to stop fraudulent telemarketers. 49 However, as explained
below, recent amendments to the TSR are primarily directed at
protecting consumers from unwanted calls regardless of the caller's
integrity.
D. A Growing Recognition of Limitations
Despite these state and federal regulations, telemarketing
complaints have continued to rise. 51 Increasingly, Congress has felt a
need to establish a national do-not-call registry to provide consumers
with a "one-stop solution" for reducing unwanted telemarketing
calls. 5 2 Pursuant to its authority under the TCFAPA, the FTC
announced the adoption of its do-not-call amendment on December
18, 2002.53 This amendment provides for a national do-not-call list of
consumer
phone numbers that telemarketers are prohibited from
54
calling.
Congress reported favorably on the FTC's national do-not-

4' 16 C.F.R. § 310.3(a)(2).
46 16 C.F.R. § 310.4(b)(1)(iii); see supra text accompanying notes 31-34.
47 H.R. REP. No. 108-8, at 3; Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 41

(2003).
48

H.R.

REP.

No. 108-8, at 3.

49 See 15 U.S.C.
50

§ 6101; see also 16 C.F.R. § 310.

Mainstream Mktg. Servs., Inc. v. FTC, No. CIV. A. 03 N0184, 2003 WL

22213517, at *3 (D. Colo. Sept. 25, 2003).
52

H.R. REP. No. 108-8, at 2.
Id.at 2-3.

3 Id.at 3.
A

16 C.F.R. 310.4 (b)(1)(iii)(B).

70
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call list, but noted that the FTC could not provide a "one-stop"
solution for all telemarketing calls because of its limited
jurisdiction.55 Accordingly, Congress directed the FCC to work with
the FTC to make their respective rules as "consistent and compatible
as possible.",56 Similarly, Congress expressed a need for the national
57
do-not-call list to work in conjunction with the various state lists.
Pursuant to these objectives, Congress enacted the DNCIA.58 Before
discussing the DNCIA, this note will briefly consider the First
Amendment challenges that have faced prior government attempts to
regulate telemarketing.
E. First Amendment Challenges
Telemarketing, in constitutional terms, enjoys status as
"commercial speech.",59 While courts have not deemed commercial
speech worthy of the full protection of the First Amendment, 60 when
the government puts restrictions on the communications of some
speakers but not others, such restrictions must be viewed with a wary
eye. 61 After all, if a substantial government interest is in need of
direct and material advancement, why not restrict all telemarketing
calls rather than just some of them? 62 Nevertheless, the Supreme
55

H.R. REP. No. 108-8, at 4.

56 Id.

Id. Many states have already provided their lists of do-not-call phone
numbers for inclusion on the national list. Don Oldenburg, 'Do Not Call' gets
complicated,Hous. CHRON., Aug. 6, 2003, at 14, availableat 2003 WL 57433365.
58 Do-Not-Call Implementation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-10, 117 Stat.
57

557 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 6101-6108 (2003)).
59 Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Pub. Serv., 447
(1980); see Van Bergen v. Minnesota, 59 F.3d 1541 (1995); see
Probst, Telemarketing, Commercial Speech, and Central Hudson:
Amendment Problems for Indiana Code Section 24-4.7 and Other
Legislation, 37 VAL. U.L. REv. 347 (2002).
60 CentralHudson, 447 U.S. at 562-63.

U.S. 557, 566
also Steven R.
Potential First
"Do-Not-Call"

61

Probst, supra note 59.

62

Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 488-89 (1995) (striking a

federal statute that restricted the advertisement of beer, but not wine or liquor). The
Court held that "[i]f combating strength wars [competition based on alcohol
content] were the goal, we would assume that Congress would regulate disclosure
of alcohol content for the strongest beverages as well as for the weakest
ones.. .There is little chance that [this statute] can directly and materially advance
its aim, while other provisions of the same Act directly undermine and counteract

2003]
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Court has consistently
upheld the constitutionality of "under6
regulations.
inclusive"
Indeed, the various state and federal laws regulating
telemarketing have, almost without exception, withstood
constitutional scrutiny. 64 Over the past decade, a series of courts have
found that telemarketing regulations, including the TCPA's
company-specific do-not-call list, directly and materially advance
the
65
government's interest in protecting the privacy of citizens.
There are at least three lines of reasoning that make courts
sympathetic to telemarketing regulations. 66 First, while restrictions
upon commercial speech over broadcast media, such as radio or
television, inevitably prevent dissemination to willing recipients,
consumer specific restrictions on point-to-point media, such as
telemarketing or mail delivered to one's residence, only prevent
dissemination to the unwilling. 67 Second, aural communication is
extremely difficult to ignore and therefore more intrusive than visual
communication. 68 Accordingly, courts have allowed more restrictive
its effects." Id.
63 Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 511 (1981)
(plurality
opinion) ("[W]hether onsite advertising is permitted or not, the prohibition of
offsite advertising is directly related to the stated objectives of traffic safety and
esthetics. This is not altered by the fact that the ordinance is underinclusive because
it permits onsite advertising"); Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co.
of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328, 342 (1986) (Puerto Rico's ban on promotional
advertising of casino gambling was upheld even though other types of gambling
were permitted); City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S.
789, 810-811 (1984) (City's prohibition against the posting of signs on public
property for esthetic reasons upheld even though it did not prohibit the posting of
signs on private property).
64 Ayres & Funk, supra note 1, at 124 (describing courts as "incredibly
amenable" to telemarketing laws); see Van Bergen v. Minnesota, 59 F.3d 1541 (8th
Cir. 1995); Moser v. FCC, 46 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 1995); State v. Casino Mktg.
Group, Inc., 491 N.W.2d 882 (Minn. 1992); Szefczek v. Hillsborough Beacon, 668
A.2d 1099 (N.J. Super. 1995).
65 Van Bergen, 59 F.3d at 1554; Moser, 46 F.3d at 974; Casino Mktg., 491

N.W.2d at 888; Szefczek, 668 A.2d at 1108.
66
67

Ayres & Funk, supra note 1, at 124-25.
See Rowan v. Post Office Dept., 397 U.S. 728 (1970) (holding that a statute

allowing an addressee to prohibit certain mailers from sending mail to addressee's
home did not offend the First Amendment); see also FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438
U.S. 726 (1978) (Justice Brennan dissenting from holding that offensive language
on radio broadcast was not protected by First Amendment).
68 See

Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 86-87 (1949) (Reed, J.) (plurality

72
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regulation of aural communication. 69 Third, courts have reasoned that
citizens in the privacy of their homes should be able to exercise a
high degree of control over the communication to which they are
subjected.70
While First Amendment concerns are perhaps inevitable
anytime communication is regulated, telemarketing regulations prior
to the DNCIA have, by and large, withstood constitutional
challenges.7 '

Il. The Do-Not-Call Implementation Act
The DNCIA authorizes the FTC to collect commercially
reasonable fees from telemarketers to offset costs related to the
implementation and enforcement of the do-not-call provision of the
TSR. 72 By funding this previously dormant provision, Congress has
drastically expanded the scope of the FTC's telemarketing
regulations.73 Additionally, the DNCIA requires the FCC to consult
and coordinate with the FTC in order to "maximize consistency"
between their respective telemarketing regulatory schemes.74 Finally,
the DNCIA requires the FCC and FTC to provide Congress with
annual reports on the progress made toward coordinating the federal
do-not-call registry with the registries maintained by states.75
A. The National Do-Not-Call List
Prior to the passage of the DNCIA, federal telemarketing
opinion).
69 id.

Rowan, 397 U.S. at 737-38 ("The ancient concept that 'a man's home is his
castle' into which 'not even the king may enter' has lost none of its vitality.... We
therefore categorically reject the argument that a vendor has a right under the
Constitution or otherwise to send unwanted material into the home of another. If
this prohibition operates to impede the flow of even valid ideas, the answer is that
no one has a right to press even 'good' ideas on an unwilling recipient.").
70

71

See sources cited supra note 64.

72

Do-Not-Call Implementation Act § 2; FTC Telemarketing Sales Rule, 16

C.F.R. § 310.4(b)(1)(B) (2003).

Ian Heath Gershengom, Telemarketing Restrictions and the First
Amendment, 20-SUM. COMM. LAW. 3, 5 (2002).
74 Do-Not-Call Implementation Act § 3.
7 § 4.
73

20031
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76
regulations could perhaps justifiably be characterized as "weak. ,
Despite the possible awareness of prior legislation, it is difficult to
imagine that many Americans thought the government clamped down
too hard on telemarketers by restricting calls between the hours of 8
a.m. and 9 p.m. 7 7 And, as for prohibiting telemarketers from calling
consumers who have already asked them not to call again, 78 this
restriction seems more like a sound business practice for the
telemarketer than a consumer protection. The DNCIA, however,
provides real restrictions on telemarketers and real protections for the
consumer.
Specifically, the DNCIA provides consumers with a free
"one-stop" method for eliminating all telemarketing calls subject to
the FTC's jurisdiction by simply adding their phone number to the
79
do-not-call list either online or by calling a toll-free number.
Telemarketers, on the other hand, are required to pay for access to the
list of consumers who they cannot call.8° Furthermore, the fees that
the FTC collects from telemarketers will be used to hire FTC
personnel to enforce the TSR and aggressively implement a national
campaign to make consumers aware of the do-not-call list. 81
The TSR exempts from the requirements of the national donot-call list telemarketers who have an existing business relationship
with the consumer, as well as charities, political organizations, and
pollsters. 82 A business relationship exists for eighteen months
following the last transaction, or three months after a consumer's83
inquiry in regard to a product or service offered by the company.

76

77
78

Pattison & McGann, supra note 7, at 196.
See supra text accompanying note 35.
See supra text accompanying notes 31 and 46.

Pattison & McGann, supra note 7, at 196. Consumers can register by
or by visiting the FTC's web site at
1-888-382-1222
calling
http://www.donotcall.gov (last visited Oct. 5, 2003).
80 Press Release, FIC, Telemarketing Sales Rule Amended to Establish Fees
for Industry Access to National Do Not Call Registry (July 29, 2003) ("[T]he
annual cost for companies to access phone numbers in the registry will be $25 per
area code, up to a maximum annual fee of $7,375 to access numbers for the entire
country. There will be no charge for companies to access the first five area codes
of data."), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2003/07/tsrfeesfm.htm (last visited
Oct. 3, 2003).
79

81

H.R. REP. No. 108-8, at 7.

82

16 C.F.R. § 310(b)(1)(B)(ii).

83

16 C.F.R. § 310.2(n).

At least one court has considered whether this
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Telemarketers, however, must still honor consumers' specific
requests that they not call again. 84 Additionally, the TSR permits
telemarketers to trump the do-not-call list by obtaining the
consumer's written permission, but "[s]uch written agreement shall
clearly evidence such person's authorization.. .and include the
telephone number
to which calls may be placed and the signature of
85
that person."
While the most prominent aspect of the DNCIA is the
creation of the do-not-call list, the Act also charges the FCC and FTC
with the responsibility of working together and with the states, to
develop a more consistent and coordinated national regulatory
scheme. 6
B. Consistency and Coordination
The FTC's amended TSR is "only one piece of a multijurisdictional puzzle."87 Determining whether a particular
telemarketing contact is permitted may involve looking to the
TCFPA, the TSR, the TCPA, the FCC's regulations under the TCPA,
and the applicable state's telemarketing regulations. 88 Even then, one
may find more inconsistencies than answers. For example, the TSR's
"abandonment rule" requires telemarketers to disconnect calls when
there is no live agent available to speak with the consumer unless a
recorded message is played within the two seconds. 89 The TCPA, on
the other hand, prohibits telemarketers from playing recorded

exception applies when a consumer asks to be placed on a company's do-not call
list while continuing to receive limited services from the company. Charvat v.
Dispatch Consumer Servs., Inc., 769 N.E.2d 829, 834 (Ohio 2002). That court held
that the "business relations" exception would not apply in such a situation,
reasoning that "[m]aintaining some limited commercial tie to a business should not
leave consumers at the mercy of unbridled telemarketing efforts." Id.
84 16 C.F.R. § 310.4(b)(1)(B)(ii). The implementation of the FTC's national
do-not-call list will not eliminate the need for telemarketers to maintain companyspecific lists.
85 16 C.F.R. § 310.4(b)(1)(B)(i). In a footnote to this provision, the FrC

authorizes electronic forms of signatures if recognized by the applicable
jurisdiction's contract law. Id. at n.6.
86 Do-Not-Call Implementation Act §§ 3-4.
87

H.R. REP. No. 108-8, at 3.

88

See id.

89

16 C.F.R. § 310.4(b)(1)(iv).
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90

messages.
Furthermore, many states provide exemptions from their do91
not-call lists for local industries or products, such as newspapers. 92
However, these exemptions are not recognized under federal law.
Until recently, it was not clear whether the New York Times, for
example, could call consumers who were registered with the national
do-not-call list in a state that exempted newspapers. Congress
declined to take a stance on the validity of these state exemptions
when they enacted the DNCIA. 93 Instead, Congress directed the FCC
and FTC to work together and with the states to "maximize
consistency" between their respective regulatory schemes.94 As
explained below, the FCC took prompt and decisive action consistent
with the DNCIA when it adopted the FTC's do-not-call
list and made
95
it clear that states may not preempt the national list.
In sum, the DNCIA activates the FTC's do-not-call list by
authorizing the FTC to collect fees for its implementation and
enforcement, and it charges the FCC and the FTC with the
responsibility of working toward a more consistent and coordinated
national regulatory scheme. While only time will tell if the DNCIA
will succeed in harmonizing the nation's telemarketing regulations
and shielding consumers from unwanted telemarketing calls, there is
reason for optimism.

IV. On the Verge of Silence or Disappointment
In one of the greatest initial access counts ever recorded for
any website, consumers jammed the FTC's website to register their
numbers with the do-not-call list. 96 Millions of consumers now
expect to control what previously seemed uncontrollable. 97 But is the
90 H.R. REP. No.
91

108-8, at 4.

Id.

92 Id.
93

Id.; see also Pattison & McGann, supra note 7, at 192.

94 Do-Not-Call Implementation Act §§ 3-4. The FCC, however, is bound by
the confines of the TCPA, and therefore will not be able to adopt rules identical to
the FTC's TSR. See H.R. REP.No. 108-8, at 4.

95See infra text accompanying notes 113-16.
96 State Telephone Regulation Report, National No-Call List Begins; State
ProgramsCan Continue, July 4, 2003, available at 2003 WL 10827207.
97 See 'Do Not Call' List Soars to 48.4 Million, WALL. ST. J., Sept. 5, 2003, at
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DNCIA better than alternative proposals? Will this legislation really
shield consumers from unwanted telemarketing calls? And, finally,
will the DNCIA survive constitutional challenges?
A. The DNCIA v. Alternative Proposals
Although some commentators have pushed different
approaches, such as an opt-in list 98 or a "pay me to listen" plan, 99 it is
not clear that these proposals are superior to the DNCIA. The opt-in
proposal would require consumers to affirmatively indicate their
willingness to receive telemarketing calls, thus abandoning the
presumption underlying the do-not-call approach that everyone is fair
game unless they take affirmative action to the contrary. 10 An opt-in
system, however, would be a drastic departure from cultural norms
and expectations. For better or worse, consumers are accustomed to
being solicited at home and virtually everywhere else. Consequently,
consumers naturally expect to have to do something in order to carve
out a solicitation sanctuary. Requiring consumers to affirmatively opt
out of telemarketing calls by going online or calling a toll-free
number is not overly burdensome.
More important, an opt-in approach would seem to be more
vulnerable to First Amendment challenges because such a law would
require willing consumers to affirmatively overcome a Fovernmentsponsored barrier to this form of commercial speech. 10 In contrast,
the DNCIA's do-not-call approach does not restrict commercial
speech until the consumer affirmatively indicates that she does not
wish to be contacted. 102 Arguably, the do-not-call model merely
provides the consumer
with the opportunity to preemptively hang up
10 3
on the telemarketer.
The "pay me to listen" approach, on the other hand, is not
A2 (forty-eight million telephone numbers were registered by August 31, 2003),
available at 2003 WL-WSJ 3978876.
98 Shannon, supra note 20, at 421.
99 Ayres & Funk, supra note 1, at 77.
100Pattison & McGann, supra note 7, at 197.
10 Cf. Pattison & McGann, supra note 7, at 197 (suggesting that there is no
evident constitutional barrier to shifting the presumption underlying the do-not-call
approach).
'02 Mainstream Mktg. Servs., Inc. v. FTC, No. CIV. A. 03 N0184, 2003 WL
22213517, at *9 (D. Colo.Sept. 25, 2003).

103 Id.
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fundamentally inconsistent with the DNCIA. 1°4 This proposal would
add language to the TSR that would allow consumers to put a price
tag on their time spent listening to telemarketing calls. 1° 5 This price
tag would be registered with the consumer's phone company, which
would connect only those telemarketers willing to pay the
consumer's price. 1° 6 This approach of marketing one's time and
privacy for a price may one day gain favor. But for now at least, the
idea seems ahead of its time because of the absence of any indication
that significant numbers of consumers and telemarketers would be
interested in participating. Moreover, since the TSR permits
telemarketers to call consumers on the do-not-call list with their
written consent, 1° 7 telemarketers are presently free to offer
compensation to consumers willing to consent to telemarketing calls.
Until this notion of compensating consumers for listening to
telemarketing pitches shows that it is a viable business practice in
need of regulation, Congress should not become involved.
B. Implementation Hurdles other than the First Amendment
Congress has given the FTC the authority and funding needed
to give consumers what they have wanted for years, namely a way to
stop unwanted telemarketing calls. 10 8 If the FTC implements the donot-call list properly, the only criticism likely to be heard
09 from
consumers is that Congress should have done this years ago.1
So, what could go wrong? Well, assuming that the FTC and
the Congressional Budget Office have accurately assessed the funds
needed to effectively establish, maintain, and enforce the do-not-call
list, 110 and setting aside constitutional concerns, there do not appear
to be any significant hurdles standing in the way of the FTC
successfully implementing the do-not-call list.
Furthermore, there is reason for optimism with regard to the
"maximize consistency" mandate of the DNCIA."' Maximizing
104See

Ayres & Funk, supra note 1, at 81-82.

'os Id. at 81.
106

Id. at 82.

107

See supra text accompanying note 73.

108

See supra text accompanying note 61.

109See
110

supra text accompanying note 30.

H.R. REP. No. 108-8, at 8.

11 Do-Not-Call Implementation Act § 3.
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consistency between the TCPA and the TSR will likely force the
FCC and FTC to make some difficult choices as the agencies
examine the areas where these laws clash and what, if anything, they
can or should do about it administratively." 12 But the FCC and FTC
have already made major progress.
In July, the FCC revised the TCPA to prohibit telemarketers
from calling Vhone numbers registered with the FTC's national donot-call list.' 3 Thus, the national do-not-call list now prohibits
telemarketing calls from common carriers, insurance companies,
banks, credit unions, savings and loans, airlines, and intrastate callers
1 14
that the FTC, because of its limited jurisdiction, cannot reach.
While states remain free to maintain their own do-not-call lists, the
federal rules now represent a "floor" for the states' do-not-call
requirements. 1 15 States may only adopt1 6more restrictive laws and
generally cannot regulate interstate calls.
The FCC's sweeping assertion of its authority under the
TCPA dramatically increases the reach of the national do-not-call list
established by the DNCIA. It also goes a long way toward developing
a more unified and consistent national regulatory scheme.
Furthermore, the FCC's revision of the TCPA may also strengthen
the DNCIA against constitutional challenges because it reduces the
number of content-based distinctions within the federal regulatory
scheme. 117 Nonetheless, the government's early successes will not
mean much if consumers who register their phone numbers with the
do-not-call list are not shielded from unwanted telemarketing calls.
C. Enforcement of the National Do-Not-Call List
Until now, telemarketers have had their way with consumers.
Indeed, there has been such an imbalance of power that the idea that
consumers will have the ability to decide who may disturb them in
the privacy of their own homes may seem more like a windfall than a
basic right. But being left alone in the privacy of one's home is a

No. 108-8, at 4.

112

See H.R. REP.

113

See Rules and Regulations Implementing the TCPA, 68 Fed. Reg. at

44,144.
114

Id. at 44,154.

115 State Telephone Regulation Report, supra note 96.
116

Id.

117

See supra text accompanying notes 60-62.
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basic right," 8 and that right will need to be defended.
If the national do-not-call list is going to protect consumers
from unwanted calls, telemarketers who violate the law need to be
punished.
The FTC and FCC will share enforcement
responsibilities 119 and may fine violators up to $11,000 per
violation. 12 However, consumers who receive illegal calls will need
to report the name or phone number of the offending corporation if
the national do-not-call list is going to be enforced. The consumer's
role as "whistle blower" should be easier now that the FCC has
prohibited telemarketers from blocking Caller ID information. 12 1
Moreover, now that the FCC has expanded the reach of the do-notcall list to virtually all businesses calling residential or wireless
telephones, it will be easier for consumers to distinguish between
legal and illegal calls. 22 There is no reason to think that the same
consumers who flooded the FTC's do-not-call website to register
their phone numbers would be unwilling to also report illegal calls.
Given the federal government's commitment to enforcing the
national list, 123 the steep fines it is authorized to collect from
violators,124 and the anticipated willingness of consumers to report
violators, it appears that the government and consumers alike are
ready to enforce the national do-not-call list. Are the courts ready,
though?
118

Rowan v. Post Office Dept., 397 U.S. 728, 737 (1970) ("The ancient

concept that 'a man's home is his castle' into which 'not even the king may enter'
has lost none of its vitality.").
119Rules and Regulations Implementing the TCPA, 68 Fed. Reg. at 44,145.
120

Brian Steinberg et al., 'Do Not Call' Registry is Pushing Telemarketers to

Plan New Pitches, WALL. ST. J., July 2, 2003, at Al, available at 2003 WL-WSJ

3972987.
121 Mary Beth Franklin, Be Vigilant, KIPLINGER'S PERS. FIN. MAG., Sept. 1,
2003, at 83, available at 2003 WL 2058042. Effective August 25, 2003,
telemarketers are prohibited from blocking Caller ID information. Rules and
Regulations Implementing the TCPA, 68 Fed. Reg. at 44,144.
122 Prior to the FCC's revision of the TCPA, see supra text accompanying note
113, even if consumers were knowledgeable of the types of businesses covered by
the list, it was not clear how consumers were going to distinguish between illegal
interstate calls, and legal intrastate calls.
123

Ryan J. Foley, Second Ruling Deals Blow to the PopularRegistry as Free

Speech Takes Focus, WALL ST. J., Sept. 26, 2003, at A3, available at 2003 WLWSJ 3980910 (Congress promptly passes bill to granting the FTC clear authority to
implement the national do-not-call list by a near unanimous vote).
124 See supra text accompanying note 120.
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D. Mainstream Marketing Services v. Federal Trade
Commission
In September 2003, the telemarketing industry won at least'1 25a
temporary victory against the FTC's "regulatory imperialism"
when the United States District Court for the District of Colorado
held that the FTC's national do-not-call list was unconstitutional
under the First Amendment. 126 Although the district court in
Mainstream Marketing acknowledged that the government had a
substantial interest in protecting consumers' privacy from unwanted
calls, the court held that the do-not-call list unconstitutionally
27
imposed a content-based restriction on commercial speech.1
The court began its analysis by considering whether the do128
not-call list even amounts to a government restriction on speech.
After all, the list does not directly limit speech; it merely provides a
mechanism by which consumers can choose to prohibit telemarketing
calls to their homes. 129 Emphasizing that the do-not-call list does not
provide consumers with the ability to restrict calls from charities, the
court concluded that the do-not-call list influences consumer choice
by allowing consumers to prohibit one type of speech but not
another. 3 0 Thus, the court held that this "entangling" of government
influence with consumer choice was sufficient to implicate the First
Amendment. 131
After determining that the do-not-call list was a government
restriction on speech, the court turned to the question of whether this
restriction materially advanced a substantial government interest as
required under Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n of N. y.1 3 2 Here, the court distinguished between regulations
that are "under-inclusive" and those that discriminate on the basis of
content. 133 The Court concluded that "[w]ere the under-inclusive
'2 Mainstream Mktg. Servs., Inc. v. FTC, No. CIV. A. 03 N0184, 2003 WL
22213517, at *5 (D. Colo. Sept. 25, 2003).
126

Id.at *18.

127

Id. at *10.

128

Id. at *8-9.

129

Id. at *9.

130

MainstreamMktg., 2003 WL 22213517, at *10.

131 id.
112

Id. at *10-11.

133

Id. at *12.
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scope of the registry the only issue relevant to whether the registry
'materially advances' the FTC's interest, this court would hold that
the amended Rules passed this part of the Central Hudson test. ' 134 In
other words, the FTC's do-not-call list does not have to prevent all
unwanted calls in order to advance the government's interest in
consumer privacy, but the list cannot allow some types of callers to
ring through while restricting others.
The FTC attempted to justify its exemption of noncommercial speech on the grounds that such speech has been
afforded a heightened level of protection under the First
Amendment.1 35 The court summarily dismissed this argument, stating
constitutional
that "[a] content-based distinction cannot be made on'1 36
grounds unrelated to the asserted government interest."
Thus, under this court's Central Hudson analysis, the national
do-not-call list violates the First Amendment. But did the Framers of
the Constitution really intend for the First Amendment to prevent the
government from protecting citizens from unwanted speech in the
privacy of their homes? In the coming months, consumers will find
out if higher courts come to a similar conclusion under Central
Hudson; or alternatively, if the Supreme Court is willing to reshape
its commercial speech analysis to protect consumers from unwanted
telemarketing calls. 13 7 On October 7, 2003, consumers received an

encouraging sign when the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals stayed the
district court's order preventing the implementation of the national
do-not-call list, pending its expedited review on the merits.

V.

An Empowered Tele-Consumer

If the government's lawyers ultimately prevail over the
telemarketing industry's lawyers, consumers will finally get what
they have wished for, namely a way to virtually eliminate unwanted
telemarketing calls. But should consumers have been more careful
about what they wished for? Might consumers actually lose
something in the bargain? And, since companies are not going to stop
selling, what kind of sales pitches might consumers expect from

134 Id.
135

MainstreamMktg., 2003 WL 22213517, at *14.

136 Id.

See Probst, supra note 59, at 362 ("Despite recurring questions by some
Justices regarding its continued viability, Central Hudson remains the test for
commercial speech regulations.").
137
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telemarketers faced with this new regulatory landscape?
The telemarketing industry suggests that aggressive
telemarketing benefits consumers by forcing companies to keep their
prices low in order to prevent their customers from being lured away
by more enticing offers from competitors. 13 8 In particular, the
industry claims that over the last decade, competition from
telemarketing has resulted in lower long-distance telephone rates and
better deals on credit cards. 139 Indeed, the fact that Americans
purchased $200 billion worth of goods and services via outbound
marketing last year suggests that telemarketers may be offering
consumers a better deal.140
If, however, telemarketing does provide consumers with the
benefits that the industry claims, then many consumers will simply
14 1
choose not to register their phone numbers with the do-not-call list.
Furthermore, even if 60 million phone numbers are eventually
registered as the FTC predicts, 14 2 there will still be more than 100
million unregistered residential phone numbers in the United
States.143 Therefore, there is little reason to believe that telemarketing
is no longer a viable industry. 144 Consumers who want to receive
telemarketing calls will find no shortage of companies willing to
contact them over the telephone. In fact, those who choose not to opt
out of the telemarketing pool may see an increase in calls because
they will be "left alone to bear the concentrated attention of the
telemarketing industry. 145
Nonetheless, telemarketers will need to adapt to this new
consumer-empowered environment. Some have suggested that the
national do-not-call list will merely cull out consumers who are

138

Kevin G. DeMarrais, Do-not-call downside; Industry leaders predict loss

of jobs, competitive prices, REC., July 9, 2003, at B01, available at 2003 WL
4623102.
139 id.
140

id.

141

Rules and Regulations Implementing the TCPA, 68 Fed. Reg. at 44,147.

142 DeMarrais,

supra note 138.

143Id.
'44 Rules and Regulations Implementing the TCPA, 68 Fed. Reg. at 44,147
("We believe that industry commenters [sic] present a false choice between the
continued viability of the telemarketing industry and the adoption of a national donot-call list.").
145 Ayres & Funk, supra note 1, at 108.

Legislating the Sound of Silence

2003]

unlikely prospects for telemarketers anyway. 46 However, current
telemarketing practices suggest that telemarketers want to call
everyone, even unlikely prospects, apparently believing that if they
call enough, the4y will eventually catch even unlikely prospects at a
weak moment.
Unless telemarketers have been woefully out of
touch with their own industry, the national do-not-call48list represents
a serious threat to the survival of many telemarketers.1
Consumers can be certain, however, that companies are not
going to stop selling. Some companies may invest more in direct
mail, traditional media advertising, and Internet-based marketing, but
these alternatives do not provide marketers with what they really
want-namely a direct line to the consumer's living room.
Consequently, consumers can expect to see some creative marketing
in the future. Perhaps telemarketers will use the mass media to invite
consumers to consent to telemarketing calls representing specific
types of products. If, for example, a consumer is interested in
products produced by reputable United States companies, or products
that are all-natural, or otherwise of a particular kind, consumers may
be given the opportunity to consent to a telemarketing package that
includes, for example, six calls a year and a 10% discount off the
normal purchase price. Alternatively, consumers may be able to elect
to receive twelve telemarketing calls a year from a particular firm in
exchange for a one-in-six million chance of winning a 2004 Cadillac
Escalade.
Even if the FTC prevails in court, the telemarketing industry
will survive. Some companies will rely on creative marketing, while
others will find success by pounding on consumers that choose not to
opt out of the telemarketing pool. The survival of the telemarketing
industry, however, will not change the fact that telemarketing in the
future will be on the consumer's terms.

VI. Conclusion
The passage of the DNCIA does not mean that consumers
have received their last unwanted telemarketing call. Indeed, judicial
146

Klett & Brightwell, supra note 3, at 41; Steinberg et al., supra note 120.

See Ayres & Funk, supra note 1, at 85. In fact, there have already been
federal regulations put in place to keep telemarketers from calling consumers that
have previously asked them not to call back. See supra text accompanying note 31.
147

148 Steinberg et al., supra note 120.
149

Id.
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review is pending. Moreover, even assuming the DNCIA's
constitutional validity, there will be telemarketers willing to test the
government's commitment to enforcing this law. But, consumers who
were annoyed by legal telemarketing calls will be even less tolerant
of illegal calls. Armed with the do-not-call list, consumer complaints
will drive government action, and the sound of silence will prevail.

